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The unemployment ratio and the share of wages have been 
of central concern to most economists who would be classed 
as Post Keynesians. This is especially true of those Cam­
bridge (UK) economists who have been most instrumental in 
developing an alternative to conventional neo-classical mac- 
rodynamics. In this paper, by putting together some obser­
vations and assumptions associated with four Cambridge mac­
roeconomists— Goodwin, Kahn, Kaldor and Joan Robinson— we 
generate a disequilibrium dynamic model of the interaction 
between the share of wages and the (un-)employment ratio.
The essential feature of the behavioural mechanism of 
the model, to be truly neo-Cambridge, is that technical 
progress and its interaction with capitalistic behaviour 
about installation of new capacity (investment) and utiliza­
tion of existing capacity together with the attempt by the 
working class to alter the functional income distribution in 
their favour should generate a dynamical system in the two 
variables of interest— the (un-)employment ratio and the 
share of wages.
Thus, by making assumptions about




v) Capital-output ratio (capacity utilization)
associated with Goodwin (1967, 1970, 1972), Kahn (1972, es­
says 7 and 9), Kaldor (1960, 1961, 1962) and Robinson 
(1956), it is shown that a very general, non-linear dynami­




























































































can be generated. Some properties, e.g., uniqueness, exist­
ence and stability (both asymptotic and structural), of the 
equilibrium for the system, are discussed where it is shown 
that the model is essentially policy oriented though it is a 
'pure capitalist' economy that is being modelled in the 
sense of not including a specific role for government.
2. The Model
We assume a closed economy producing one industrial 
good (or product of manufacturing industry) with no explicit 





v _ L _ N
v L “ N
where: L = level of employment
N = level of population (or labour supply) 
v = employment ratio
mlu = —P
• •• * * V f  "T"
a = = - E - - £>u m p Y L
where: u = share of wages
m = money wage rate 
p = price level
































































































(i) Money-wage dynamics :
Assumption 1_:
(5)
where f e C ' and g £ C '
and f* > 0, g' > 0, m = m >>0
Thus, following Goodwin (1967, 1970, 1972), Kahn (1972, 
ch. 7), Kaldor (1959) and Robinson (1956, ch. 20), we relate 
growth (proportional) in money wages to some function of the 
employment ratio (proxy for level or rate of unemployment) 
and growth in prices. This is, of course, Phillips-Curve 
wisdom. That there is empirical justification for such a 
relation is discussed in Santomero-Seater (1978). The Cam­




£ = X (log m - log p + log tt + log Y + log L) (6)
l .e. , £ = X (log tt + log u) P (7)
where fr > 1 (the mark-up factor)
and X >0 (the adjustment coefficient)
More generally, we may write (7) as;
P (8)
where h' >0 and h e  C  u




























































































Kaldor (1970), p. 3, Kaldor (1959), pp. 216-220, Robinson 
(1956), p. 179)— with the additional proviso that observed 
prices adjust to equilibrium prices in an exponentially dis­
tributed lag form (cf. also Rowthorn (1977), p. 218 and fn. 
for a lucid verbal explanation of such adjustments).
(iii) Technical Progress Function:
For the great classical economists and Marx, unemploy­
ment was closely linked to, and, indeed even solely generat­
ed by--in some cases— the interaction between technical 
progress and accumulation (i.e., investment). The Cambridge 
economists have quite explicitly carried on this distin­
guished tradition. The neo-classical detour via a produc­
tion function, in dynamical systems, is not only unnecessary 
but also insufficient (cf. Hildenbrand (1981), in particular
p. 1108).
Assumption 3_ (The Technical Progress Function) :
Ÿ _ L 
Y ” L b K L (9)
where K: Capacity (Capital)
and £ £ C '
This relation is, of course, the famous Kaldorian tech­
nical progress function where growth in output per man is 
related to investment per capita (cf. Kaldor (1961), p. 265, 
Kaldor (1961), pp. 207-208, and Kaldor-Mirrlees). It must 
be pointed out that the Kaldorian non-vintage, non-linear 
technical progress function can be derived with only the ef­
fect of increasing capital per man playing a fundamental 
role (cf. Kennedy (1961)).




























































































of using such a function because, as observed in the opening 
lines of this sub-section, we would like the fluctuations in 
the employment ratio (the 'reserve army of labour') to de­
pend primarily on the interaction between growth in produc­
tivity (technical progress) and accumulation (investment).
(iv) The Investment Function:
Given the Kaldorian idea that:
. . . the rate of investment in period 1, as a propor­
tion of the income of that period, equals the rate of 
growth of income over the previous period multiplied by 
the capital-output ratio of the current period, plus a 
term depending on the change in the rate of profit over 
the previous period
(Kaldor (1960), pp. 277-278)
and modifying it appropriately to make it conformable to our 
continuous-time version as distinct from Kaldor's discrete­
time version, we get:










(v) Capital-Output Ratio (or Capacity Utilization):
The simplest possible assumption to account for short- 
run variations in the degree of utilization of capacity and 
labour-hoarding, and at the same time leading to "steady 
capital-output ratios over long periods" (cf. Kaldor, 1961, 




























































































served capital-output ratio, the desired capital-output ra­
tio and the employment ratio (cf. Desai, 1973)
Assumption 5_:
where f* < 0  and e C'
where we have subsumed the 'desired capital-output ratio' in 
the functional form relating 'observed capital-output ratio' 
with the employment ratio.
As an example of the way in which such a relationship, 
in any particular form, takes account of less than full uti­
lization of capacity, we may consider the following function 
suggested by Desai (1973):
k = k*v~ y
where 0 < y ^ 1 and k : desired capital-output ratio
Then, whenever employment is less than full, the amount 
of non-utilized capacity is positive and given by:
From (1) ~ (12) we can derive a 'reduced form' dynami­
cal system in the phase-plane for u and v. From (12) we 
get:
substituting (12) in (11) we get
(12)
(14)





























































































Dividing both sides by v and rearranging, we get:






g (1 - u)
G (v,u) = f1 (v) (17)




By substituting (14) in (9) we get:
Y
Y t +L g d  - u) f1 (v) f 1 (v) (19)
We now make the following assumption (which could, for 
example, be dispensed with, if we made explicit endogenous 
assumptions about labour supply— as a function of real wag­
es, for. eg.— or if we assumed that population growth was a 
given exogenous factor):
Assumption 6_ (Additive Separable Technical Progress 
Function):
The technical progress function can be written as an 
additive function of growth in productivity and the profits 
term of the investment equation, the latter multiplied by 






























































































Put (- - 1) (- - -) = b (— - k)ï  L b 1 Y L Y L (21)
Then :
B <! 7 7 ^  h ^ ï1 '1
From (22) we get:
L  g (n - u) I7(„ (V) J f„ (v)1 7 1
Put
'1 / ‘1
Now, substituting (5), (8) and (24) in (4), we get:
(22)
(23)
= D (v, u) (24)
Put
— = f (v) + g (£) - Ê _ d (v, u) u 1 P P
= f ( v) + g1^h(u;X , ir ̂  - h(u;X , tt ) - D(v,u)




where we have suppressed, in H, the explicit indication of 
its dependence on the parameters { X ,tt} .
Then, ^ = H(v,u) (27)
Thus, the dynamical system, for the employment ratio 
and the share of wages, will be given by (18) and (27). A 
striking feature in the derivation of (18) and (27) is that 
no explicit assumption whatsoever has been made about growth 
in population. The inherent dynamics of the model automati­
cally generates the 'industrial reserve army' (quite in ac­
cordance with Marx's views).
3. The Working of the Model




























































































uniqueness and stability of interesting equilibrium situations 
we must make more specific and typically 'Cambridge assump­
tions'— so far as it is possible— about the functional rela­
tionships. This we proceed to do now.
Assumption 1_ (A 'Keynesian' Assumption) :
g' = ^  >0,u 9 u
This means that the increase in the share of wages, through 
demand effects, will stimulate investment. The reverse as­
sumption would be a 'classical' assumption (in Keynes' sense 
of the term) in that any increase in the share of wages, by 
depressing the current (and expected) profit rates, acts as a 
deterrent in the investment equation (cf. also Kalecki (1971), 
ch. 14 and Steindl (1952), p. 237). Using assumption 7 in 




9 u > 0 (28)
Using (17) a direct evaluation of changes in the propor­
tional growth rate of the employment ratio for infinitesimal 
changes in the ratio gives:
9G
9v
v3g,9 v u) f, (v) /
r" *-i
f ;(v) - vf?(v) — -}
v f; (v) 2 (29)
The denominator is unambiguously positive. Since, by as­
sumption, f,' (v) < 0 and f',' (v) > 0 and v > 0, the second term 
in the numerator (i.e., the terms enlosed with the curly 
brackets) will be unambiguously negative and hence:




























































































In the first term in the numerator, we have a positive
denominator and in the numerator we have v > 0. Considering 
3q,now in conjunction with the reasoning behind assumption
we would naturally assume this to be positive. Intuitively 
speaking, this is another 'Keynesian' or Cambridge' assump­
tion— the investment effects of increases in employment are 
further increases in investments through the demand effects 
of the employment multiplier:
7
. . . a high demand for labour is associated with a high 
rate of investment . . .
(Kaldor (1970), p. 5)
We assume, therefore:
Assumption 8_:
9G—  <3v 0
Now, from (25) and (26) we have:
(31)
9 (~ ) u
9 u
Clearly, —  > 
Also 9hit) .
= 9H = _9£> 9 h _ 9 h _ _ 3 D  
9u 3h 3u 3u 3u
0 (cf. (8) and assumptions in conjunction with 
could be assumed to be positive.
Since we have assumed that investment is stimulated by 
increases in the share of labour (at least in a non-full-em- 
ployment situation - assumption 7), quite naturally it fol­
lows that productivity would also be stimulated by increases
in the share of labour ('high-wage, high-productive' econo- 
3D *1my!), i.e. —  > 0. One way of putting these assumptions to-
1. We referred to Kalecki’s famous article on 'Class Struggle 
and Distribution of National Income' below assumption 7. 
It is important to bear in mind the arguments given in 
making assumption 7 operational. As it is, the assump­




























































































gether would be to reason as follows: if the proportional
growth in money wage rates due to indexation clauses with re­
spect to inflation (price rises) less growth in productivity 
due to changes in the share of wages is dominated by infla­
tion, then the proportional growth in the share with respect
economy, closed for foreign trade and without an explicit 
role for government. The arguments behind assumption 7 
become clear in a two- or multi-sector economy, as for 
example, in Kalecki's typically Marxian 3-sector economy 
or Joan Robinson's 2-sector models. Thus, as Kalecki ar­
gued:
Until fairly recently it was generally accepted that 
if wages are raised profits decline PRO TANTO. Even 
though in the analysis of other phenomena Say's law 
was not adhered to, at least not strictly, in this 
case the preservation of purchasing power was not 
put to doubt. And the analysis of increase or re­
duction in wage rates dealt with the physical conse­
quences of this absolute shift from profits to wages 
or VICE VERSA. In the case of the rise in wage 
rates, the reconstruction of capital equipment in 
line with the higher spending on wage goods and low­
er outlays on investment and capitalists' consump­
tion was emphasized; as well as the tendency to 
higher unemployment as a result of substitution of 
capital for labour that has become more expensive.
. . . the argument based on Say's law would 
. . . prove fallacious— at least with regard to the 
short period considered.
The last qualification is essential. For it 
may be argued that the decline in the volume of in­
vestment and capitalists' consumption as a result of 
the wage rise although not immediate would still 
come about with delay, say, in the next short peri­
od. And this would be true if capitalists at least 
DECIDED to cut their investment and consumption im­
mediately after having agreed to raise wages. But 
even this is unlikely . . .
(Kalecki (1971), pp. 156-158) 
(My emphasis)
Precisely the same reasoning is followed by Steindl (op. 
cit.) :
. . . the increase of wages could never reduce prof­
its as long as investment and capitalist consumption 
remain high . . .




























































































to chances in the share is negative. This brings the redis­
tributive role of inflation very clearly to the surface. 
When, therefore, inflation has this strong redistributive 
role we can assume:
Assumption 9̂:
In a sense, this assumption compensates for the 'counter-in­
tuitive' assumption 7. These two assumptions (i.e., 7 and 
9) are, perhaps, reflected in Marx:
A rise in the price of labour, as a consequence of ac­
cumulation of capital, only means, in fact, that the 
length and weight of the golden chain the wage-worker 
has already forged for himself, allow of a relaxation 
of the tension of it . . .
The rise of wages therefore is confined within 
limits that not only leave intact the foundations of 
the capitalistic system, but also secure its reproduc­
tion on a progressive scale.
The conflict implied in having assumptions 7 and 8 working 
together within the same model underlies the common strands 
in a Marx inspired Kaleckian model and a Keynes inspired 
Cambridge model (Nuti (1977)) on conclusions about function­
al income distribution and employment.
Now, from (25) we have:
(33)
(Marx (1965), pp. 618-620)
— —  = = f'(v) - D'(v,u)
3 v 3v v (34)
where (35)
Clearly, in the neighbourhood of full employment, the 




























































































the 'Phillips curve wisdom'). The second term on the r.h.s. 
of (34) is not easy to interpret. A possible line of argu­
ment would be as follows: In the early stages of the up-turn
there would be large gains in labour productivity for small 
increases in the employment ratio due to labour-hoarding. As 
full employment is approached the gains in productivity due 
to this cause would be blunted. Thus, in the neighbourhood 
of full employment, it would be reasonable to expect f'(v) to 
dominate D'(v,u) and moreover both are positive. Therefore
«H ^—  > 0. (Of course, it is possible that there exists a crit-9v
ical level of the employment ratio such that the two effects 
cancel each other (and hence the reverse effect valid for 
values on the 'other side' of the critical level); we ignore 
this here; elsewhere we have analyzed these other possibili­
ties (cf. Velupillai (1978), (1979(a)).
Thus:
Assumption 1 0:





v > 0 (36)
The existence of capitalists in a system where the share 
of wages is unity is of course absurd. Ricardo, in the chap­
ter 'On Profits' summarized this situation quite well:
The rise in the price of necessaries and in the wages of 
labour is however limited; for as soon as wages should 
be equal . . . to . . . the whole receipts of the farm­
er, there must be an end of accumulation; for no capital 
can then yield any profit whatever, and no additional 
labour can be demanded. . . . Long indeed before this 




























































































all accumulation . . .
(Ricardo (1951), p. 120)
(cf. also the above quotation from Marx). Thus, however much 
the employment ratio may rise— even to the extent of full em­
ployment— the existence of a capitalist system presupposes 
the existence of profits. This means there is not only a 
limit to the level of the share of wages but also a limit to 
its growth rate— becoming zero or negative after some point. 
In the spirit, therefore, and within the context in which we 
made assumptions 7 ~ 10, in particular assumptions 7 and 9, 
we may be justified in making the following additional as­
sumption:
Assumption 11:
3 r , n 3h H (v,u)3vC G (v,u)J + u — > (37)
This is an eminently reasonable assumption for any capi­
talistic system. What it intuitively means is what is de­
scribed above from the writings of Marx and Ricardo; roughly 
speaking, the proportional growth in the share of wages is 
dominated by a compounding of the level it has already 
reached and the growth rate of the employment ratio. We can 
rewrite (37) as:
3G 3HG(v,u) + v —  + u —3v 3u H (v,u) (38)
In the form of (38) the inequality is unambiguously rea­
sonable. Finally, let us observe that we have the natural 
limits 0 < v 1 and 0 < u ^ 1. In addition, we note the 
following: as the employment ratio falls, there is some val­
ue of v = v at which, and below which, the share of labour 
cannot grow; similarly, at some low level u = u ('poverty 




























































































ratio cannot grow. On the other hand, if the two variables 
simultaneously take on very low values, then naturally their 
growth rates would be at least non-negative but more plausi­
bly (certainly for an advanced capitalist economy very low 
initial conditions would be almost impossible) strictly posi­
tive . Lumping these assumptions together, we have:
Assumption 1 2:
a) G (0,0) > 0
b) H (0,0) > 0
c) v = v such that G(v,0) = 0
d) u = u such that H(0,u) = 0
A final remark before we derive some concrete results 
about equilibrium: if we take assumptions 7 ~ 12 together
with equations and inequalities (28) ~ (36) we have what is
sometimes called a generalized SYMBIOTIC model. What we have 
is a 'partly complementary, partly hostile' relationship be­
tween labour and capital.
If now we take (36) and (33) on the one hand and (28) 
and (31) on the other, we see that the slopes of
Q = G-1 (0) (39)
and R = H_1 (0) (40)
are positive. A possible configuration of Q and R satisfying 
assumptions 7 ~ 12 together with (28) ~ (36) would be as in 
figure 1.
Because of the upper bounds on v and u (being +1) any 
trajectory that leads to ONE of these bounds must, on econom­
ic grounds, lead to a change of 'regime'. These almost unat­
tainable (in a capitalist system) limits are the 'inverses' 




























































































p. 48). The ideal solution, from the workers' point of view, 
would be when Q and R intersect at u = 1 and v = 1, as shown 
for a possible Q and R in figure 2. When the functional 
forms are subject to control— eg., via the parameters in 
them, or by making one or more of the variables a control 
variable— then that elusive point on the far northeast corner 
becomes almost possible, at least in the minds of policy mak­
ers .
In the Appendix we prove some theorems on existence, 
uniqueness, global asymptotic stability and structural sta­
bility of the equilibrium.
4. Conclusions and Policy Implications
Theorems 1 and 2 (cf. Appendix) summarize what may be 
called results of 'Keynesian assumptions' for a capitalist 
economy. Assuming the conditions that guarantee existence of 
equilibrium, in this symbiotic system, labour and capital 
complement each other. High share of wages leading to high 
consumption; this leads to high quasi-rents for, at least, 
one class of capitalists who may then demand more goods from 
other capitalists and thus investment is stimulated leading 
to high employment. But the system can end up at a low con­
figuration of v and u for an appropriate intersection of Q 
and R. Thus we can have capitalistic systems of the 'high- 
wage, high employment' type or 'low wage, low employment' 
type or even 'high wage, low employment' and 'low wage, high 
employment' types. So, along with Kaldor, we may also say 
that the 'heights' and 'slopes' of the Q and R curves, mean­
ing thereby, to a large extent, the 'heights' and 'slopes' of 
the constituent functions, expresses the particular capital­




























































































its'. Since the crucial functions that determine the shape 
of Q and R are:
(a) The profits (or expectation) term in the investment 
equation;
(b) The technical progress function;
(c) Wage dynamics;
(d) Inflation and its effects on wage dynamics through 
bargaining;
(e) Capitalists' 'hiring and firing' policies (labour­
hoarding effect on the capital-output ratio) and 
capacity utilization policies;
it is evident that it is possible to achieve the 'high wage, 
high employment' capitalist economy that many social demo­
cratic governments seem to have as their aim— or, as Goodwin 
put it:
. . . this golden goose egg theory of capitalism
(Goodwin (1972), p. 446)
However, it is clear that economic conditions of a very di­
verse nature can guarantee existence— in particular: Classi­
cal, Marxian, Keynesian, etc. Also, the fact that the system 
is structurally stable means that it is robust for empirical 
analysis and policy purposes.
It will be evident that the analysis and the model(s) 
developed owe nothing to neo-classical methodology. Marginal 
productivities, marginal cost pricing, competitive markets, 
aggregate production functions, profit maximization and other 
well known concepts and methodology of neo-classical econom­
ics, though not inconsistent with an appropriately modified 
form of the model developed here, are not necessary for any 
of the conclusions. Marginal analysis, the 'bread-and-but­




























































































the choice— theoretic or optimization framework of microeco­
nomics . Thus recent research in so-called 'microeconomic 
foundations of macroeconomics' or the attempts to make com­
patible Walrasian microeconomics and Keynesian macroeconom­
ics, ultimately reduce to providing choice-theoretic frame­
works such that the two fields can be reconciled. The dise­
quilibrium macrodynamics in this tradition, inspired by 
Barro-Grossman (1976), Malinvaud (1977, 1980), etc., are, 
therefore, ultimately 'marginal' in substance. However, the 
passage from the micro choice-theoretic framework to macro 
seems to be as ad-hoc as the Keynesian macroeconomics that 
has been criticized. (Appeal is made to the 'representative 
firm', 'the representative consumer', etc. Analytically, 
such assumptions are identical to the assumption of homoge­
neous labour and equal organic composition of capital on a 
tradition richer in dynamics.) To say, therefore, that the 
model developed in this paper is not inconsistent with neo­
classical methodology only means that the constituent func­
tional relations can be given a microeconomic choice theo­
retic rationale. That this has not been attempted here is 
not an accident— nor is it to condone ad-hoc macroeconomics. 
The fundamental dynamics of a capitalist society must be 
such as to reproduce the relations of exchange, production 
and distribution that characterize it. It is our conjecture 
that there are macroeconomic relations that cannot (and in­
deed should not) be given microfoundations. Borrowing 
Pasinetti's celebrated statement used in a different— but 
related— context, we may say that these relations are macro- 
economic because they cannot be otherwise (cf. Pasinetti 
(1974), p. 118). The foundations for such relations should 
be sought not in microeconomics as conventionally understood 




























































































ly, in those forces that determine the class structure of so­
ciety (cf. also Hicks in Harcourt, ed. (1977), pp. 373-374 
and Hicks (1979), pp. vii-viii). It is perhaps ironical that 
such a conjecture can even be extrapolated from the recent 
results of Sonnenschein (1972, 1973a, 1973b), and Debreu 
(1974) .
As a framework for macropolicy discussions, however, 
there are serious limitations in the structure of the model 
presented in this paper. In particular the disequilibrium is 
confined to the labour market. The Keynesian problem of ef­
fective demand is, therefore, only a shadow. It is, never­
theless, not difficult to introduce a simultaneous disequi­
librium also in the goods market. The analysis loses the 
simplicity of two dimensions and this is the main reason for 
avoiding this important question explicitly. In Fitoussi- 
Velupillai (1981) this deficiency is rectified, and we con­
sider the dynamics of functional income distribution in the 
presence of disequilibria in both the labour and goodsmarket.
Beyond that the further deficiencies are, in particular, 
three:
(a) Assumption of a closed economy.
(b) No explicit role for a government.
(c) It is a real and not a monetary economy.
The obvious extensions of the model above, if found useful, 
would be to relax these assumptions. We do not subscribe to 
the view that disaggregation is essential for the questions 
we have chosen to discuss— employment and functional income 
distribution. This space, the space of v-u, appears to be 
the natural space for the Cambridge economists in particular 
and Post Keynesians in general— as indeed for the great Clas­





























































































A P P E N D I X
We will now prove some theorems on existence, uniqueness, 
global asymptotic stability and structural stability of the 
equilibrium. For convenience in the proofs we slightly dis­
tort the order and prove, first, uniqueness by assuming exist­
ence and then prove existence and stability properties after 
that.
Theorem 1_: (Uniqueness)
Assume that Q and R intersect in 0 < v ̂  1 and 0 < u ̂  1 
such that their tangent lines are distinct. Under assump­
tions 7 ~ 10 and 12 for the dynamical system in v and u given 
by (18) and (27) with (36), (33), (28) and (31), the equilib­
rium is unique.
(For the assumptions of theorem 1, a possible configura­
tion of the dynamics in the phase-plane of v and u is given 
in figure 3.)
Proof :
Clearly, there are no closed orbits. This is because 
all trajectories in each basic region (cf. Hirsch-Smale 
(1974), p. 267) are monotone. By assumption there is an 
equilibrium in 0 < v $ 1, 0 <  u £ 1. By (28), (31) and (33), 
(36) the slopes of Q and R are positive and monotone. Hence 
the equilibrium is unique.
Now, the following is a theorem giving sufficient condi­
tions for existence of equilibrium.
Theorem 2: (Existence - uniqueness)
If the direct effect of increase in employment on propor­




























































































fects due to increases in the share of wages (i.e., if
) and if similar condition holds for the share of3G > 3G3 v 3u
wages (i.e., if 3u
5Ë
3v
urn which is unique. 
Proof:
), then there exists an equilibri-
Only existence in the first part of the theorem needs 
proof because uniqueness follows from the proof of theorem 
1. As in theorem 1, closed orbits are ruled out because 
every trajectory in each basic region is monotone. Hence, 
from the fact that the limit sets of trajectories are closed 
and invariant and from the fact that every basic region to­
gether with its closure is either positively or negatively 
invariant it follows, by the Poincare-Bendixson theorem that 
all w-limit points are equilibria. (For an explanation of 
the technical terms used in this proof see any good book on 
the Qualitative Theory of Differential Equations such as 
Coddington and Levison (1955), Nemytskii-Stepanov (1964) or 
Hirsch-Smale (1974).
Q . E . D .
It must be remarked that the word 'equilibrium' carries 
with it no normative significance. The most plausible equi­
librium for an economy with our assumptions would be well 
inside the unit square determined by 0 ̂  v ̂  1 and 0 u 1
— though perhaps in the upper northeast corner rather than 
the lower southwest part of the square. All this simply 
means that equilibrium, in our system, will be characterized 
by under-full employment and a value for the share of wages 
well under unity.




























































































Theorem 3: (Global Asymptotic Stability)
Under assumption 7 ~ 12 for the dynamical system in v 
and u given by (18) and (27) with (36), (33), (28) and (31)
and the conditions for existence assumed in theorem 2, the 
equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable.
Proof:
We use the sufficiency conditions of Olech (1963). By 
Olech's theorem (op. cit.) sufficient conditions for global 
asymptotic stability are (in the phase-plane):
(a) Negative trace of the Jacobian of a Dynamical 
System
(b) Positive determinant from the Jacobian
(c) Either the product of the diagonal terms or the 
product of the off-diagonal terms must be non-ze­
ro
(a), (b), (c) to hold, in general, on the plane. However,
for our purposes, any initial conditions must be in the 
unit square determined by 0 v< v J 1 and 0 ^ u £ 1; there­
fore we are only interested in the non-negative orthant 
circumscribed by the natural economic limits on v and u.
Now, from assumption 11 and equations (29) and (32) we 
see that condition a) of Olech's theorem is satisfied.
From the conditions of the first part of theorem 2 
(guaranteeing existence) and from (36), (33), (28) and (31) 
we see that the determinant from the Jacobian is positive.
Finally, condition c) is immediate from any combina­
tion of the four inequalities (36), (33), (28) and (31)
(and the non-negativity of v and u).




























































































asymptotically stable. (Even otherwise the theorem is valid 
but irrelevant from an economic point of view.)
Theorem 4_: (Structural Stability)
The dynamic system for v and u given by (18) and (27) 
under (36), (33), (28) and (31) and assumptions 7 ~ 10 and 12 
is structurally stable.
Proof:
Since we are only interested in the structural stability 
of a feasible equilibrium it is immediate that condition c of 
theorem 2 in Hirsch-Smale (op. cit.), p. 314 is satisfied.
Since closed orbits are ruled out by the above theorems 
condition b) of the same theorem in Hirsch-Smale is also sat­
isfied.
Finally, direct computation verifies that condition (a) 
of the same theorem in Hirsch-Smale is also satisfied.
Thus, the dynamical system is structurally stable.
Q.E.D.
Some remarks about the structural stability theorem may 
not be out of place. Firstly we may point out that elsewhere 
(cf. Velupillai (1979c)) we have gone into the technical de­
tails of the definition of structural stability and the link 
between the Hirsch-Smale definition and the 'classical' 
(Andronov et al. (op. cit.), De Baggis (1952)) definition. 
Secondly, we feel that for an operational model, i.e., where 
observations are important, structural stability is much more 
important than ordinary stability. Roughly speaking, struc­
tural stability means that the qualitative behaviour of the 
system is invariant to small perturbations in the parameters. 
This was why Andronov and Pontryagin (1937) called systems 
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